美中全球议题对话项目

这次采访是用英语进行的。

Eleanor M. Albert: Our guest today is Ayumi Teraoka, an assistant professor of politics at Brandeis University. She studies alliance politics and security issues in the Indo-Pacific. Her forthcoming book examines the history of U.S. alliance management in Asia from the 1960s to the present, illuminating the conditions under which the United States successfully negotiated geopolitically contested issues with allies, including air defense integration and the defense of Taiwan, in the face of China's opposition. Ayumi, it's great to have you back on the show. It's a real treat.

Ayumi Teraoka: Thank you so much for having me back. 

Eleanor M. Albert: We're going to talk today about Japan's foreign policy vis-à-vis China, but before we start, perhaps we could begin with a little intro on who Japan's new prime minister is?

Ayumi Teraoka: Sanae Takaichi is the current prime minister of Japan, inaugurated in October. She leads the largest Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been ruling the party for decades, during Cold War and even today, but she now has a new ruling coalition partner, which is [the] Japan Innovation Party, and most excitingly, of course, she's the first-ever female leader of Japan. 

She was first elected to parliament in 1993 as a part of a different party, New Frontiers Party, which was sort of [a] reformist party at the time, but then she joined LDP in 1996. I think what also makes her special, it's not that she's a woman, but she comes from a non-dynastic family, which means that her family is not a traditional family of politicians. Her parents were working class and then she went to Matsushita seikei juku [Matsushita Institute of Government and Management], which is a prep school made for raising next-generation leaders founded by Panasonic founder Matsushita Konosuke. That prep school had [a] new-generation leaders who didn't have any dynastic background. 

She grew an LDP leadership career being affiliated with late Shinzo Abe. It was Abe who led the efforts behind her first candidacy in [the] LDP election leadership race in 2021. She lost that time against Kashida, but that officialized her position as Abe's successor or Abe's protege. She has close views with Abe on history. She has visited controversial Yasukuni Shrine that enshrines war criminals from [the] Tokyo trials. She rose up as a right-wing conservative leader within a group that is less willing to accept Japan's culpability in the war [World War II].

Her views on foreign policy also are strongly impacted by Abe and Abe's foreign policy visions of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, often known as FOIP. She appointed recently Keiichi Ichikawa from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be her national security advisor, and Ichikawa is known to be the architect of FOIP vision when Abe was in power. She must know, after working closely with Abe, that Abe's foreign policy was not as successful if he didn't [get] the China piece right. 

When Abe came into office in 2012, China had very similar, coercive campaign against Abe, describing him as a historical revisionist. But ultimately, China came to admit that Abe was going to be in power for a while and China also had to have a working relationship with Japan. In [the] later years of Abe’s administration, Xi Jinping and Abe's relationship was pretty positive. There was also talk about Xi Jinping visiting Japan for a state visit, which never came to fruition because of [the] COVID-19 pandemic. Takaichi must know that she also wants to stabilize a relationship with Beijing.

Eleanor M. Albert: Fascinating way to start her administration if that is on her foreign policy agenda. Beijing and Tokyo are not in a good place. They're at loggerheads, in a bit of a diplomatic crisis. I'm curious if you could walk us through how we got here. She's inaugurated in October. She has all this influence in thinking about how Abe wants to see Japan's role in the world and in the Indo-Pacific. What happens?

Ayumi Teraoka: One thing you should know about Takaichi is she's a pretty straight talker, and that's why she's also popular among the public that she doesn't really give BS on policy. She gives straight answers to questions. In parliament, when she came into office, there was a Diet debate between her and [an] opposition party member, former Foreign Minister Okada from Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, and Okada was really trying to ask Takaichi whether she held the previous positions that she had, which is that contingency around Taiwan, which includes [an] armed attack on Taiwan from Beijing or even [a] naval blockade around [the] Taiwan Strait would constitute what is called [a] Japan survival-threatening situation, which means because that the situation constitutes an existing threat to Japan, that would allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense and allowing Japan to use force, even if Japan itself was not attacked.

Takaichi, after evading that question for a little bit, ultimately said, yes, of course it could constitute as survival-threatening situation for Japan.  Again, what she said, in terms of context, everybody knew that because [of] the proximity, of course, any crisis or military situation around [the] Taiwan Strait would have devastating consequences for Japan, but nobody really said that in public, let alone the prime minister of Japan [on] the Diet floor. That's why it really triggered Chinese responses. 

Initially, the response came from [the Chinese] Consulate General of Osaka who had a really dramatic, threatening statement saying that Takaichi should be beheaded basically, but that social media post has been taken down [and the] Chinese government is now putting forward a campaign more on the official line and demand[ing] Takaichi to take down the statement, or correct her statement, which [the] Japanese government's not willing to do. 

Then, the coercive pressures include re-suspending import of seafood from Japan, canceling cultural exchanges like music concerts, movie releases from Japan, and also advising individuals, tourists from China not to go to Japan, basically saying that Japan doesn't have a welcoming climate for Chinese tourists at this time. It's a massive campaign of economic coercion against Japan, which Japan has experienced before and many other U.S. allies and partners have so far. It's a very familiar tactic for Beijing. 

Most recently, there was some military crisis around Japanese territory where Chinese fighter jets also, according to Japanese media reports and defense authorities, had locked radar on Japanese fighter jets who were preparing to scramble, if necessary, around [a] Chinese military exercise. It's been a pretty intense relationship and moment between China and Japan.

Eleanor M. Albert: What I think is so interesting is that the intensity of this moment makes us have to look back at history because there's a reason for this type of statement to be so inflammatory from Beijing's perspective. It's been a long source of tension. Where does Taiwan fit into this complicated history? You alluded to the war, but maybe we could provide a little bit of context of where Taiwan sits within the historical tension between Beijing and Tokyo.

Ayumi Teraoka: China's position with Taiwan has always been integral part of China. Japan also has a One China policy. Japan doesn't recognize Taiwan sovereignty or doesn't have a position on it, but encourages peaceful resolution of differences between [the] Taiwan Strait. Taiwan, of course, has been occupied by Japan, colonized by Japan from 1895 to 1945 for 50 years as a part of a victory for Japan to win the first Sino-Japanese war and as a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Qing dynasty. Since 1945, Japan has relinquished those territorial gains and hasn't had any political willingness to really get into the politics of Taiwan sovereignty vis-à-vis China, especially after 1972 [with]Tanaka's visit to China, rapprochement with PRC [People’s Republic of China].

Historically, because of the history of Japan's occupation of Taiwan, Beijing has been extra sensitive about Japan's potential involvement over Taiwan issues. Beijing has been skeptical about Japan-Taiwan ties, going back to the 50 years of occupation, colonial history, and this sense of alarm and suspicion of China toward what they see as [an] ulterior motive of Japan to encourage independent forces in Taiwan more than the reality. Japanese politicians have been very careful not to be involved in this sovereignty dispute between China and Taiwan. 

But after [the] 1990s of Taiwan's democratization and more recently, Beijing's military coercion against Taiwan, I think Tokyo has come to [the] realization that Japan has to step up and make sure that China understands that any armed attack against Taiwan or naval blockade constitutes an armed attack or coercive measure against Taiwan [and] would have consequences for Japan as well. Therefore Japan has a point of view and really wants to discourage Beijing from taking such an actions. That's that.

Also, Taiwanese and Japanese societies have always had a very close relationship and I think this sense of affinity between two peoples is pretty strong. Economically too, these two economies are closely interrelated. Because [of] Taiwan's special position in [the] semiconductor industry, TSMC—major fabrication company of chips—have one factory in Kumamoto that's already operating. There's also talk about a second factory opening up. That planning is still in discussion about what kind of chips they want to produce, but there is this strategic element of discussion happening between Japan and Taiwan on this key sector.

Eleanor M. Albert: I want to unpack a little bit about the repercussions of what Tokyo's statement about a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan and how that would constitute a survival threat. It's also been alluded to as an existential crisis for Tokyo. Will that have broader impact on security dynamics in Asia? Tokyo has constraints on the way in which it can use its military force built into its constitution. A statement like this sets it apart saying, “No, these are instances in which our military would be allowed to engage.” How will Japan staking this position impact the security strategies and thinking of other Asian powers in the Indo-Pacific?

Ayumi Teraoka: Takaichi's statement was stating the obvious part out loud, so quiet part out loud for the first time. In that sense, that statement was reducing Japan's strategic ambiguity on this question of whether Japan would be involved in contingency around Taiwan. At the same time, if you look at her statement closely, she only said it could constitute, right? She didn't say that it will. 

There is still a political judgment that will take place if such a situation arise[s]. In that sense, I think she was really stating the obvious, and that's why, if you look at public polling on her statement, [the] majority of Japanese respondents to the poll say, “I think what she said was correct and justified.” Maybe she didn't have to say that. That point draws a lot of criticism from her opponents. Because of that nature of her statement simply stating the obvious, I don't think it really changes the geopolitical picture in Asia, but given this coercive campaign in response to Takaichi's statement, countries like the Philippines, Australia are watching the consequences of such explicit statement.

These leaders of other countries will be a lot more cautious, learning a lesson from Takaichi's case, not to say explicitly what they would do in [a] Taiwan contingency. At the same time, there is an argument to be made that such a statement actually reassures Taiwanese that they're not alone in this context and in potential coercion from Beijing. It has reassured political leaders in Taipei who often feel that they're isolated and they don't have enough allies and partners because of their very unique position in international politics. In a way, I think the consequences of her statement, whether it proved to have a net positive or not, remains to be seen.

Eleanor M. Albert: With this coercive campaign, it seems counterintuitive to how we opened the conversation about Takaichi being very aware that she has to have some sort of working relationship with Beijing, right? They are large economies in Asia. They are influential in the region. If they want to work together, and she wants to follow in the footsteps of Abe in trying to forge some sort of coexisting relationship, what types of recommendations might you make to walk back some of these tensions? Are there risks of the current dynamics escalating, or do we think this is performative in some way from the Beijing side?

Ayumi Teraoka: This is a very tough situation where both sides really can't walk back from what they've already done. Takaichi, or [the] Japanese government, finds it very difficult to retract that statement because that, in and of itself, will be escalatory by implying that Japan may not be involved in such a contingency. It also has an implication for [the] U.S.-Japan alliance because, ultimately, whether that situation would constitute as an existential crisis for Japan or not, and whether Japan can exercise the right of collective self-defense also means whether Japan will be behind U.S. military operations around Taiwan, so Japan can't take it back. 

Then Beijing, because of its nationalist campaign rhetoric around this issue, it's also hard for them to not react, but also to walk back what they have already done. One suggestion I have is that Takaichi has to solidify her domestic political base. If Beijing finds that Takaichi will be around for years to come, then Beijing would have [an] incentive to find a space to work with her, which is exactly what happened with Abe. For that, I think she needs to focus on economic policies and various issues that the public cares about and then make substantial progress with improving her domestic political situation.

In terms of risk of escalations, what I'm worried about is nationalism within China. So far on the Japanese side, there is a dominant narrative that we shouldn't overreact to these coercive campaigning or pressures coming from Beijing. But from Chinese side, the question of Taiwan and Japan's potential involvement in Taiwan are so close to [the] domestic nationalism narrative that is so integral to [the] Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy. It's hard for the leadership to restrain or change that narrative. 

I can see that lower-ranking officials within [the] bureaucracy of military [might] take actions to please their leadership or [to be] align line with [the] party line so that the leadership level cannot really punish them. Many people are taking actions only in the direction of escalation without any sort of consequences from the top. I worry that situation continuing into further escalation on the military arena; I have a sense that that might be partly why the military escalation happened at sea recently.

I wonder how a Chinese leader can walk back that narrative, especially in [an] era where Chinese people might be dissatisfied with the current state of [the] economy and have always been taught that China has to stand firm on the question of Taiwan, especially against Japan's involvement.

Eleanor M. Albert: This makes me think of Jessica Chen Weiss's work about Chinese responses to tensions with Japan in earlier iterations around some of this stuff. What is the threshold of too much nationalism within Beijing, among the people for them to say, “Oh, we need to reign this in and find a more stable ground to stand?”

We alluded to the U.S. component. Where does Washington stand right now? It has a major treaty alliance with Japan. It has some serious implications for the type of role it wants to play in the Indo-Pacific, at least as laid out from prior administrations. Should Washington be playing a role? Where do you see the U.S. in this diplomatic crisis?

Ayumi Teraoka: Well, Ambassador [George Edward] Glass in Japan has taken a clear stance issuing statements to support Japan and criticiz[ing] China's coercion and escalatory dynamics, whereas other parts of [the] Trump administration have been rather quiet. There was [a] phone call taking place between Takaichi and President Trump, but what actually was conversed between the two has been sort of controversial, and we don't know, but Trump hasn't been taking a very clear stance on this crisis developing between China and Japan. 

Many suspect that Washington, and the White House in particular, doesn't really want to rock the boat with Beijing at this time, especially [as] they're negotiating trade deals, and they're looking to have positive momentum toward the president's visit to Beijing planned in the spring. There's mixed signals coming from Washington how affirmatively [the] U.S. is supporting Japan's position on a statement that would support U.S. military operations around Taiwan.

Also, these statements are fine, but I also think that Japan would never be fully assured by statements, right? We also know that President Trump often issues conflicting messages depending on different audiences, so it's really hard to gauge one statement or another will be actually a message that would stick or will be implemented. Statements have a weakened impact. 

At the same time, more recently [the] U.S. and Japan had multiple military joint military exercises; more recently, U.S. strategic bombers joined the Japanese fighter jets. This is a more quiet message, but [a] very strong show of force. Those types of signals coming on the military side, I think will be a lot more assuring. I think Beijing is also watching how [the] U.S. will react, both on the military aspect, the behavioral aspect and also statements.

The views and opinions expressed are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the position of Georgetown University.

Outro

The U.S.-China Nexus is created, produced, and edited by me, Eleanor M. Albert. Our music is from Universal Production Music. Special thanks to Shimeng Tong, Tuoya Wulan, and Amy Vander Vliet. For more initiative programming, videos, and links to events, visit our website at uschinadialogue.georgetown.edu. And don’t forget to subscribe to our podcast on Apple podcasts, Spotify, or your preferred podcast platform.