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September 30, 2016

Responding To: U.S.- China Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

The North Korea Conundrum: A Chance for Consistency

Caleb Huffman

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conundrum provides China and the United States an opportunity to set a high-water mark in the realm of diplomacy. Together, the two world powers can promote peace and security in the region, and consequently internationally, by ending their mutually contradictory strategies toward Pyongyang and instead developing complementary approaches.

Neither the United States nor China supports North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Yet, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear program, claiming this year to have succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon small enough to fit on a warhead. Neither the United States nor China supports the bellicose rhetoric of the Kim Jong-un administration, which recently accused the United States of declaring war on North Korea. Mutual concerns held surrounding North Korea revolve around a common concern: regional instability. North Korea’s actions continue to destabilize East Asia, affecting global powers such as Russia and Japan. Despite mutual concern, the United States and China are executing discordant strategies toward North Korea.

The Obama administration has selected a strategy of “strategic patience.” This strategy involves crippling economic sanctions and political isolation. The United States has calculated that a collapsed North Korea would be better for regional stability than maintenance of the current regime. In hopes that North Korea’s heated rhetoric and persistent pursuit of nuclear weapons would continue to isolate it—even from its neighbor, China—the United States has sanctioned trade, fuel shipments, and even humanitarian aid to North Korea. The theory is that harsh, deteriorating economic conditions will push the Kim Jong-un administration to compromise on its nuclear ambitions or, better yet from the United States’ perspective, collapse altogether. To complement the sanctions, the United States has avoided direct diplomatic connections with North Korea, saying that talks cannot begin unless North Korea signals a willingness to compromise on its nuclear aspirations.

China fears regional instability even more than a fully nuclear North Korea. Consequently, China has chosen the strategy of supporting the continuation of Kim Jong-un’s administration, while simultaneously applying diplomatic pressure to restructure North Korea’s economy, similar to Chinese reforms implemented in the late 1970s. China is North Korea’s largest trading partner and most crucial ally in the international arena, providing Pyongyang a desperately needed economic and political lifeline.

The United States' and China’s strategies clash. The United States, through sanctions, aims to destabilize North Korea to the point of forced submission or collapse, with no intention of directly working with the state. China aims to avoid a collapse of North Korea, instead providing critical economic support for the country and using diplomacy to pressure the Kim Jong-un administration toward giving up its nuclear ambitions and promoting economic reform. As the United States blocks trade with North Korea, China maintains a trading partnership. As China seeks to involve the Kim Jong-un administration in discussions for regime reform, the United States refuses to come to the table, unless North Korea agrees to strict and, from Kim Jong-un’s perspective, unrealistic preconditions.

Both strategies wish to achieve the same goal: increased regional stability. Ironically, both goals perpetuate regional instability. If Washington succeeded in destabilizing North Korea, it would result in a massive refugee crisis and power struggle over the pieces of the former regime. Beijing’s strategy of support and diplomacy props up a combative regime and even increases the need to heed its pugnacious rhetoric in the international sphere. Washington’s sanctions have failed to cripple the state or even force compromise—but have deepened the impoverishment of an entire country. Despite Beijing’s success in maintaining the North Korean regime, thousands of North Koreans flee to China every year. Washington’s economic sanctions are partially to blame for the refugee crisis, and China’s support of the regime is partially to blame for Kim Jong-un’s continued rein.

China and the United States must both realign their strategies, accepting the positive and negative consequences of such a decision. At least, then, the positive benefits of the strategy would appear less ambiguously. A China-U.S. strategy could take many forms. Perhaps it could completely cut off North Korea economically, resulting in its collapse. This would destabilize the region, but also prevent North Korea from ever becoming a mature nuclear power. Potentially, it could result in a reunited Korean peninsula and a thriving trade partner for China and the United States. Alternately, a China-U.S. strategy could be designed to lift many of the non-military economic sanctions on North Korea, allowing North Korea a tempting opportunity for exponential economic growth. Such profitable growth would stabilize the regime and provide an incentive to give up its destabilizing rhetoric and, perhaps, even its nuclear program.

The strategy that the United States and China ultimately decide on can take many forms. What is important is that the two countries remain in concert. Such a diplomatic move would increase long-term regional stability and set a new precedent of international cohesion toward a more secure and peaceful world.

Caleb Huffman is pursuing an undergraduate double major in political science and communication at the University of Washington.


COMMENT FROM MINGYAN "AMY" DUAN (November 21, 2016):

It has been a great pleasure to read your logical, lucid, and insightful article. For people like myself, without prior sound knowledge of the North Korea conundrum, they would become much clearer on the current issues after reading this. You present a profound understanding of both the Chinese and U.S. strategies toward Pyongyang in terms of their start points, positive benefits, and undesirable consequences. The statement that “Both strategies wish to achieve the same goal: increased regional stability. Ironically, both goals perpetuate regional instability,” demonstrates sound judgment. What confuses me is that, although proposing complementary approaches at the beginning, you seem to end up with strategies that completely abandon the United States’ or China’s current standpoints. What about the possible massive refugee crisis or uncontrollable nuclear expansion?


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