Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues

Eleanor M. Albert: Today our guest is Maria Adele Carrai. She is an assistant professor of global China studies at NYU Shanghai. Her research explores the history of international law in East Asia and investigates how China’s rise as a global power shapes norms and redefines the international distribution of power. She co-leads the research initiative Mapping Global China, and is the author of Sovereignty in China. A Genealogy of a Concept since 1840 (2019) and co-editor of The China Questions 2 – Critical Insights into US-China Relations (2022).

It's a pleasure to have you. Thanks for joining us!

Maria Adele Carrai: Thank you for having me here. It's an honor, and it's a great pleasure.

Eleanor M. Albert: Before we dig into the meat of our conversation about China, and sovereignty, I always try to ask my guests, how did you come to study China? And then of course, how did sovereignty as a theme come about as something that you wanted to
investigate?

Maria Adele Carrai: I was very intrigued by China, so I studied Chinese as an undergrad, and in my master's studies in Italy, London, and then I spent time in China, and it just felt actually very exotic to me when I was in high school.

It's also a matter of circumstance that I found myself studying Chinese, because I wasn't decided between Arabic and Chinese at the beginning of my university. Then Chinese happened to be better organized in Roma La Sapienza, and then I stuck to Chinese. And I didn't have a career in mind at all back then, and I encourage students that are deciding what to do to also be more free, and follow their passions, rather than career goals. Things happen in weird ways, very often, more often than what we think.

And sovereignty: so my initial interest [in] law came from legal philosophy. I was very interested in natural law, comparing Chinese tradition and Western tradition. And then I was very interested in China, in international relations, and I thought that sovereignty was a great lens through which I could observe the way China behaved within the international system, and international rules, because it's a key concept of the world we live in, international relations, norms. There's sovereign states, the way the world is organized today through this concept—which is a bit of a fiction—but I think we're going to talk more about that in a minute.

Eleanor M. Albert: Absolutely. That's a great segue. In terms of talking about sovereignty, I think there's a general definition that can be thought of as a “supreme authority.” It, of course, is a major concept in political science, and international affairs, in which we think about territorial integrity and inviolable borders. Does China accept this definition? What are some of the characteristics of the concept of sovereignty that might resonate most with today's Chinese political culture?

Maria Adele Carrai: China is a huge supporter of the so-called Westphalian sovereignty: the traditional concept of sovereignty defined as supreme authority of a state. So, that has a territory, a population, and the principle of non-interference. You cannot interfere in domestic affairs of another state. And China... since the concept was introduced in the late Qing Empire, this idea of sovereignty, and of course China had its own idea of sovereignty. Sovereignty can be filled with different meanings at different times. But, in the nineteenth century, sovereignty was attached to the system of modern international law, certain practices, diplomacies, and so forth. Again, the idea of non-interference.

China, because it felt itself as a victim of the system of these foreigners coming in its own territory, applying extraterritoriality—meaning using their own laws in what was considered Chinese territory—it has always been very protective about this concept. So, you cannot interfere. It’s so strict about it. This very hard concept of territorial sovereignty that was also encapsulated with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the ‘50s with the foundation of the PRC [People’s Republic of China].

For instance, now it opposes broader ways of conceiving sovereignty that include human rights or responsibility to protect. One of the reasons why China is so concerned with its own sovereignty... partly it’s because of its history of perceiving itself as a victim of other states, other countries’ encroachment upon its sovereignty, but also because China, it’s a work in progress today. We can see this with Taiwan, Hong Kong I guess has been resolved, but the recent history of the PRC and actually, of the past century, I would say, has been an effort to redefine [China’s] sovereignty from an imperial state that has this sometimes not clearly defined relationship with its tributary, to a sovereign state with fixed borders (with Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang).

There are all these issues that are related to the history and to the fact that China has to inscribe its own territory, its broad imperial territories, within this framework of sovereignty that was kind of imposed [and] partly appropriated by China in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It’s attached to this very strict definition of sovereignty as supreme authority, non-interference. You cannot be concerned with what happens within China, and this broad definition of China that includes South China Sea, Taiwan, and that can be problematic.

Eleanor M. Albert: It’s interesting, because you bring up this imposition of the concept of sovereignty, but China also has a bit of a tradition of adopting outside ideas, and then re-appropriating them, and applying them through a Chinese lens. But at the same time, China’s long history also has this traditional political hierarchy based on the tributary system and this legacy of Pax Sinica that existed under imperial times. How does China today try to have both of these traditions coexist? Is there tension, or are there ways in which political elites in China have refashioned the conception of sovereign autonomy to align, and better fit with these kind of traditional principles about what China is?

Maria Adele Carrai: It’s a great point, the one you raised, and it’s also the point that I tried to make with my book, Sovereignty in China, Genealogy of a Concept Since 1840. China has appropriated this concept and used [it] to create China, a new China, with territories that were loosely connected to China. Again, these issues with Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, et cetera, are really the results of China adopting these tools. These are really tools to shape China in its own interest.

Yes, there is a conflict—some tension between sovereignty, imperial powers—but I think it has to do with the very nature of the concept of sovereignty, and how historically it was realized, and its ambiguity, its hypocrisy in the same way. So, we see China now even with Ukraine-Russia, that it's ambivalent. It supports sovereignty, but then it supports Russia invading Ukraine.

In terms of Pax Sinica, it’s very interesting to see what China is doing with the Belt and Road Initiative, and what China is today: a global China that is present all over the world, this unbounded China, because we see Chinese people, Chinese companies, Chinese tech, all over the world. This clash with the idea of territoriality, of strict territoriality—especially now with new technologies, the state can reach its diaspora abroad, wherever it is, so it has this sort of jurisdiction.

Also, we see examples of China’s special economic zones all over the world, where sometimes it’s basically moving Chinese jurisdiction over these special economic zones, where they’re all Chinese workers, Chinese almost laws being applied. So, sort of extra territoriality of the twenty-first century.

That, of course, clashes with the idea of sovereignty, or non-interference, and I think [it is] one of the concerns of the Global South. China is very much trying to impress the Global South, and create this sort of movement of China in the Global South. “We are together, we experienced the same... We’ve been the victim of colonialism, and we respect sovereignty.”

But then on the other side, there is a lot of concern from these countries that receive money from China—investments, infrastructure—that China might infringe upon their own sovereignty because of the sheer presence, in terms of people, economic interests, finance, and that might challenge this notion it promotes. Here we can see the tension between China win-win, right? Pax Sinica, where “We’re here to improve the world.” The destiny of humankind...

Eleanor M. Albert: Shared destiny for humankind.

Maria Adele Carrai: Shared destiny. Exactly. That in a way evokes this Pax Sinica, right? "We're here to do good;  we're not imperialist." But then at the same time, you have this very concrete, tangible presence, and very often [China] is perceived as a threat because it modifies some of the behaviors in the recipient countries' dynamic social pattern, trade, economics, and so forth, in the positive and in the negative.

Eleanor M. Albert: In direct and indirect ways. A lot of times you have states that are in some ways willing to compromise some of what might be their own sovereignty in order to attract, or appeal to, Chinese investments or development.

You just gave a great overview. We talked about the contemporary tensions, but I wanted to dig into your historical knowledge about China's relationship with sovereignty, and sovereign autonomy, especially as we've had a real change in the institutional architecture of global governance organizations. Westphalian concepts didn't necessarily anticipate that there would be all of these organizations that would help gather together to try and solve common problems. And so, I was curious if there are examples of Chinese flexibility in thinking about sovereignty? Whether those are more contemporary, or even dating back to more historical times, if this tension of wanting to be part of this international architecture of global governance organizations challenges China's steadfast sovereignty dedication?

Maria Adele Carrai: Historically, yes, there are instances in which some of these intellectuals, they tried to promote United Nations, and even almost having a tribunal to decide, and to basically override the authority of the state. Historically, you can see that happening. And even today there have been some intellectuals talking about redefining sovereignty.

Sovereignty should be understood in a more flexible way, precisely because China now has all these interests abroad, all these people abroad, and if it sticks to this very rigid Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, it will not be able to extend its reach—its jurisdictional reach, its authority over its interests abroad. So this has changed.

But, I think this goes to show how this concept, despite in the recent history of China seems very Westphalian, there's been a lot of transformations. And nothing can reassure us about the behavior of China in the future, even if it sticks to this very strict understanding of sovereignty. We don't know what the future will be like.

That's also something that I discussed in the book, if we look at the history, because it made sense for China in that particular time, or in these past decades, to embrace this idea of sovereignty to protect itself as a shield against foreign powers, but also as a way to assert its authority over these loose territories. But recently, things have changed. Even if you think about Deng Xiaoping, the opening up, joining the [World Trade Organization] in a way, that was a big internal debate because you compromise partly your economic sovereignty, and sovereignty is made of many different layers: economic sovereignty, territorial sovereignty, and so forth.

Eleanor M. Albert: I want to use this time to ask about different contemporary crises that might have a sovereignty component attached to it. So, even though China has kind of beaten its chest as an ardent absolutist of sovereignty, it isn't necessarily living up to its position. For starters, since we've talked a little bit about Belt and Road, are there changes or indications of how China might think about sovereignty when it comes to its efforts to protect overseas investment projects? Are there instances where China has made more explicit claims about how it wants to protect those?

Maria Adele Carrai: With regard to the Belt and Road Initiatives, there's been official statements and actions of China moving to protect its people abroad with military operations. They mobilized within Libya, for instance; they went and helped their own nationals evacuate Libya. Also, in the rhetoric of Xi Jinping, and others, there is all this emphasis on Chinese nationals abroad. They're part of China. And what does it mean? It's a question mark. Does it mean that they're going to, again, have some sort of jurisdiction over them or not? It's to be determined.

There are mixed signals, but this is always the intention with what China portrays itself, with the Global South: "We're developing countries, and we are committed to promote, respect sovereignty, and so we will not interfere with your own domestic affairs." But again, the way it's behaving, especially in the Russia-Ukraine case, it's kind of an alarming time for the developing world, because we don't really understand where China is.

Another aspect is this idea of debt trap that has to do also with sovereignty. According to this narrative, China is giving a lot of money, creating all this debt, and then will take assets from this country, like Hambantota port, Mombasa port. But in my studies, and other very respected scholars' studies like Deborah Brautigam, that looked at Mombasa, there was a mistake... I mean, it was just insane, but there's no evidence of China—the government—trying to actively take over these assets, that [would] be a huge breach of the sovereignty of the recipient countries.

Also, one thing that we have to understand when we think about China, we always think in terms of this malevolent central government, party that has this direct reach, and direct control over all these actors abroad. But that actually is not the case because if you look at the reality of China abroad, what China is doing, yes, some of it is coordinated. There are attempts that are clumsy, very often. Actually, the result is the opposite of what the central government
would've wished for.

Even this media campaign globally, sometimes it backfires. It obtained the opposite result, creating more suspicion, it's so obvious, the propaganda sometimes. And so I think that there is this lack of control of this very complex network of economic actors of China abroad, including state-owned enterprises, or businesses, tech businesses, right? Huawei, and like, we still don't know exactly the relationship between the company, and the government, how much they really follow the instructions of the government, and all these other private actors that exist abroad.

Eleanor M. Albert: That's a really good point, and I think in some ways, because of how extended China has become through the work of this complex network of actors, the ability to be nimble, and address certain types of issues that might have sovereignty implications means that it doesn't actually have the maneuverability that it wants to, because it's done far away from capital. It kind of plays a catch-up game in some ways.

Maria Adele Carrai: Another aspect is also that China is trying to operate within the international system. It tries to gain more seats and power within international organizations, and institutions, creating institutions of its own: the AIIB [Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank], that is modeled on the World Bank, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Those are also interesting if you want to look at what China's doing in the international system, rather than trying to corrode the sovereignty of other countries. So, I think it's more sophisticated, it's complex, the way China operates to change the international system. And of course, sovereignty is where you look because it's the basis of our international society, but there's not just that. There's also international organizations that China tends to respect and tries to have a bigger say, successfully very often.

Eleanor M. Albert: Absolutely. Now, you brought up the Russia-Ukraine war earlier. I wanted to pivot back to that a little bit and have you unpack for us a little bit where China has positioned itself on this.

Maria Adele Carrai: I think China ultimately wants peace. We also have to understand that China borders with Russia, so it has different security concerns than United States, or other countries. If Russia enters a war indirectly with NATO members, it will be not good for China because then you'll have all these refugees trying to get into China. And China sided with Russia, not fully officially, but de facto, providing arms. I don't know the details of that, but, of course from a rhetorical point of view, it was not so great. Because you talk about self-determination, you talk about respecting sovereignty, and then you're basically siding [with] Russia, this huge autocratic power, invading Ukraine, seizing territories.

So, this goes against what China is preaching and it can scare other small countries, because they say, "Oh, China is also an autocracy. What if in the future it starts to invade territories?" And what it is also doing for some, in the South China Sea, for instance, against Vietnam, or other countries its bullying in the South China Sea. We don't know. So, I don't think it's very good for China, but China also might not have many other choices. So, it's understandable in a way why it will take the Russian side, given its security concerns.

Eleanor M. Albert: Right. It makes a lot of sense that security concerns, especially on one's borders, might override some type of principled position on sovereignty. What's interesting is there's a complete tension in that crisis vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian crisis that has flared up, in that China has been very consistent in talking about self-determination and a two-state solution. So, to have both conflicts at the same time, I think really shows some of the precariousness of how much we give weight to this concept of sovereignty, even though it is the defining characteristic of our international system.

Maria Adele Carrai: The complexity of this concept, and how it's very malleable, in a way, depending on the interest of that particular moment. There are some fundamentals, of course, and I don't think China will invade another country, but again, you can justify things in different ways. Even with Russia and Ukraine, I think China would've loved to be seen as a peacemaker, and I think it tried genuinely, but it's just out of control, and you have to sort of pick sides.

Eleanor M. Albert: I think they would've been very happy to have been in that role, and to position themselves in that way. I wanted to, as a concluding question, ask how you view China's more nuanced, or dynamic interpretations of sovereignty with that of other great powers? So, say the United States: what is the U.S.'s view of sovereignty? Do they share similarities or differences?

Maria Adele Carrai: The U.S. is probably still a greater power in a way than China. I mean, China's getting there, so it's more conservative in its understanding of sovereignty, because again, it still has to protect itself. But great powers have a tendency of not really respecting sovereignty, and we can see with the United States, and we'll see also what this new president will do. Historically great powers have not respected sovereignty. They might preach it, but then if you look at their behavior, they're far from it. Maybe China will become more like the United States in the future, in terms of encroaching upon sovereignty.

And there are many ways in which you can do it nowadays. It's not that you have to seize territories necessarily, but it can be influence campaigns, investments, or you have the economy of other countries in your hand. You dictate how the economies of other countries should proceed, should evolve, trade, and so forth. China is still respecting sovereignty probably more than the United States, but the further it raises, if it does—because now I guess the rosy trajectory that we thought for China 10 years ago—it's probably different now. We're in a very difficult time, very hard to predict what will be next. A lot of surprises happen, the world order is being redefined.

Eleanor M. Albert: We're in a time of uncertainty in thinking about what our foundational international system is going to continue to look like and that will depend on the actions of a lot of different powers.

The views and opinions expressed are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the position of Georgetown University.

Outro

The U.S.-China Nexus is created, produced, and edited by me, Eleanor M. Albert. Our music is from Universal Production Music. Special thanks to Shimeng Tong, Tuoya Wulan, and Amy Vander Vliet. For more initiative programming, videos, and links to events, visit our website at uschinadialogue.georgetown.edu. And don’t forget to subscribe to our podcast on Apple podcasts, Spotify, or your preferred podcast platform.