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Further Reflections on Cosmopolitanism’s Uneasy Relationship with Pluralism
David Wong | May 1, 2024
Responding To: Comparative Perspectives on Cosmopolitanism
Li Yong
One of the key issues of the current debate about global justice is the rivalry between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Cosmopolitanism commits to the idea that as a citizen of the world, one has impartial obligations to people outside the national borders. In contrast, nationalism commits to the idea that due to our national identity, one has special obligations (only) to people inside the national border. There are various arguments for cosmopolitanism or nationalism. Their disputes can be reduced to disagreements on certain fundamental points of global justice. In light of these disputes, I argue that the Confucian idea of tianxia is an alternative to cosmopolitanism and nationalism.
Some scholars of nationalism focus on the negative effects of cosmopolitanism. Yael Tamir argues for liberal nationalism by focusing on how the kind of globalism that is promoted by cosmopolitans would destabilize cultural and social identities. Tamir claims that nationality does provide culture membership. Nation as a mental structure is similar to families, tribes, and friendships that count against alienation and loneliness. More importantly, globalism and neoliberalism destabilize social classes. The worst off are hurt due to global markets and investments. Without a centralized political system, the most disadvantaged in a nation do not benefit from the global interdependence. They call for protection, which can be provided by nations.
Even though there are strong arguments for nationalism, cosmopolitanism instead enjoys more popularity among contemporary philosophers. It seems that most philosophy scholars would support the idea that we are obligated to help those in need even if they are outside our national borders. For example, Peter Singer appeals to the utilitarian principle that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of (comparable) moral importance, we ought morally to do it.” It seems that helping those who are in extreme poverty outside our national borders would prevent them from dying from hunger, while we are not sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. Thus, we have a moral obligation to help them. This simple principle establishes a cosmopolitan obligation to people outside national borders.
One may find that the arguments for nationalism and cosmopolitanism are both convincing and reasonable. The arguments for nationalism focus on the significance of nationality. In contrast, the arguments for cosmopolitanism focus on the significance of a global community. Thus, it is important for us to understand their real disagreements before we proceed to endorse either position.
I think that there are at least three substantial disputes between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The first dispute between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is about the basic moral agents of global justice. For nationalism, the basic moral agents of global justice should be nations. In contrast, for cosmopolitanism, the basic moral agents of global justice should be individuals. The second dispute between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is about the boundary of distributive justice. For nationalism, the nation-state is the limit of distributive justice; however, for cosmopolitanism, it is injustice if one fails to help those in need outside national borders. The third dispute between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is about the nature of their approaches. Nationalism seems to commit to a kind of realism, whereas cosmopolitanism seems to commit to a kind of idealism.
Many mainland Chinese scholars claim that the idea of tianxia, rather than nation or state, is one of the most important and distinctive ideas in China culture. In a narrow way, following the historical usage, tianxia refers to the benevolent ruling and moral order among states governed by the Zhou state around 3,000 years ago. In a broad way, tianxia could refer to a moral and political hierarchical global order that is not based on nation-states with equal status that compete with each other. What makes tianxia a unique version of nationalism is the hierarchical nature of the global order. Some nations are superior than other nations. A moral nation is better than an immoral nation. A nation ruled by virtue is superior than a nation ruled by power. However, one may argue that tianxia is more than mere nationalism since it values datong and tianxia weigong. The dimension that Confucian cosmopolitanism philosophers have argued for cannot be merely ignored.
In conclusion, I think that on the one hand, the datong ideal renders tianxia different from other versions of nationalism. On the other hand, love with distinctions plus the idea of a hierarchical order among states renders tianxia different from other versions of cosmopolitanism. Thus, tianxia is neither a simple nationalism nor a simple cosmopolitanism. It is a version of statist cosmopolitanism that endorses inequality among states and aims for flourishing of all.
This essay is an excerpt of a longer paper, written as part of the author's participation in the Georgetown University Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues' U.S.-China Research Group on Cosmopolitanism, that will be published in a forthcoming special issue of the Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture.
Li Yong is a professor of philosophy and associate dean of the School of Philosophy at Wuhan University.
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